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Another Approach
to Corporate Stock Basis
By Alan L. Feld

contribution. It helps to map a largely unexplored
continent
of tax
law, the
use and
ordon Warnke's
article,
makes
a significant
determination of adjusted basis in corporate shares
in connection with certain nonrecognition transactions, recently elaborated in Reg. §1.358-2.2 The
regulation provides guidance of particular relevance
to the allocation of basis when the shareholder owns
two or more batches of stock with differing adjusted
bases. As Gordon's article makes clear, apparently
simple tax law directives concerning the treatment of
adjusted basis raise difficult questions and choices,
often in common situations. In this article, I propose
to make explicit some of the polarities that underlie
the choices in this area and to state some places
where I differ from Gordon as to their resolution.
Ownership of shares of corporate stock performs
two different investment functions and the ambiguities that arise in the measurement of a shareholder's
adjusted basis in corporate stock reflect them. Investors may hold shares as representing a fractional
interest in the activities of the corporation itself, looking directly to the enterprise for primary returns on
investment. In the extreme case, a sole shareholder
depends entirely on the corporation's activities for
its rewards. Other investors may hold shares as a
financial instrument that produces income, gain or
loss with some independence from the activities of
the corporation. Thus, the risks and returns to an investor in a publicly traded company depend at least
as much on the operation of financial market forces
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as on the corporation's successes or failures. A long
history reflects this duality. Each of these functions
points to a different kind of income measurement,
either based on consideration of the entire investment
or based on a relevant portion of it. The differences
emerge starkly in determining how to treat a partial
disposition of shares in a taxable transaction. When
a shareholder sells to a third party less than all the
shares owned, tax law determines gain or loss on
a share by share basis, reflecting the status of each
share as a separate financial investment.4 When a
shareholder sells some shares directly to the issuing
corporation, however, the Code determines whether
to characterize the transaction as a sale or a corporate
distribution by reference to the change in the shareholder's relative stake in the corporation and not by
reference to each share. Application of an aggregate
approach occasionally produces a different measure
of gain than the separate unit approach.
Basis determinations reflect these differences.
Adjusted basis of stock in an exchange operates as
a stacking or ordering rule to determine the extent
to which proceeds received in the exchange reflect
a return of investment. When an investor sells all
the shares owned to another investor, the ordering
generally recovers the full amount of the adjusted
basis first, with any overage or shortfall producing
gain or loss.6 When the shareholder disposes of less
than all the interest in the corporation, the ordering
question becomes more complicated and may turn
on whether to apply a unified or per unit approach
to adjusted basis. Gordon's article analyzes the
results for a deceptively simple case, ownership of
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10 shares, each with a basis of five and another 10
shares, each with a basis of 10, for atotal investment
of 150, in the context of many different transactions
and points out the difficulties encountered and the
decision points along the way. Much of his analysis
tracks the unit-by-unit approach adopted in Reg.
§1.358-2 in 2006. I want to suggest an alternative
approach to a subset of the transactions that may
avoid some of the less attractive results of current
law and may provide a better guide in the areas
currently lacking authority.
Basis considerations in exchanges of stock arise
at two different points, ex ante and ex post. Basis
first determines the extent of recovery of the shareholder's prior investment in the corporation's shares
to measure gain or loss on the exchange. After that
determination, a second issue deals with allocation
of basis to the assets acquired on the exchange,
and any shares previously owned and retained, so
as to create a base for the measurement of future
gain or loss. The basis rule going forward also will
have implications for the holding period of each
asset. Further, application of the ex ante stacking
rule requires a judgment as to which investments
to count in the calculation. Should recovery of
the investment and measurement of gain involve
only the specific shares tendered in an exchange,
all the shares owned within the same class or all
classes of stock in the same corporation? Gordon's
article pushes the question down further, to shares
of the same class held in separate brokerage accounts, and asks whether, as a practical matter, the
basis inquiry should look only to the shares in any
single account in certain circumstances. Finally,
the basis determination ex post raises the possibility of fragmentation, the embodiment within
a single share of two different basis calculations,
now required in some exchanges under the new
Code Sec. 358 regulations. 7 Fragmentation already

existed in some measure prior to adoption of the
Code Sec. 358 regulations, 8 but as Gordon's article

states, the unit-by-unit approach of the regulations
makes fragmentation more common and brings
complexity and unresolved questions to mainstream reorganizations.
Gordon's article carefully examines the decisions taken in the Code Sec. 358 regulations. The
regulations start from a simple value judgment that
combines two well-established tax rules. First, a
shareholder ordinarily treats adjusted basis on a
separate unit-by-unit approach under Reg. §1.1012-
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1 (c). This allows a shareholder who disposes of less
than all shares owned to choose between different
batches of stock with different tax characteristics.
Second, reorganization exchanges do not constitute
recognition events to the extent of qualified consideration. It seems to follow that an exchange of stock
for stock in a reorganization ordinarily should leave
the allocation of adjusted basis unchanged. The
shareholder therefore should retain separate-block
adjusted bases in the new shares received and should
not average stock bases. The regulations play out the
implications of that conclusion by tracing basis in a
variety of exchanges.
While this value judgment coherently addresses
the treatment of adjusted basis ex post, it does not
of itself suggest how to order or stack adjusted basis
ex ante in dealings between the shareholder and the
corporation, including reorganizations that may result
in gain recognition. Preservation of the shareholder's
ability to elect which shares to exchange in a later
taxable transaction need not imply a similar election within the reorganization exchange itself. The
regulations, however, seem to push the unit-by-unit
analysis to its logical conclusion with occasionally
unfortunate results. A competing vision emerges from
the Code's treatment of distributions to shareholders
from the corporation, one that takes a more unitary
view of the shareholder's investment. I propose to
modify the regulations' across-the-board unit-byunit approach, with the application of a unified or
aggregate approach in assessing dealings between
the shareholder and the corporation, leaving the
unit-by-unit determination for dealings between the
shareholder and outside parties. Thus, in distributions
from the corporation, the shareholder first would
treat the stacking question on a unified basis. After
determining the tax consequences of the transaction,
adjusted basis going forward will affect third-party
dealings, and allocation of basis on a unit by unit
approach would apply.
Consider a corporate distribution to shareholders
without surrender of shares. After exhaustion of earnings and profits, the distribution reduces adjusted
basis of the stock and any excess gives rise to gain.9
Suppose a shareholder who owns 10 shares with a
basis of $5 per share and 10 shares of the same class
of stock with a basis of $10 per share receives a distribution from the corporation of $140. The corporation
had no earnings and profits. On a per unit approach,
each share receives $7, so that 10 shares have gain of
$2 each, leaving zero basis going forward, while the
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other 10 shares have no gain and $3 of adjusted basis
going forward. An aggregate basis approach instead
marshals the basis in all the shares, $150, so that
none of the distribution results in gain. This seems a
more logical approach to the corporation's dealings
with its shareholder: tax all distributions of earnings
as dividends, then allow the recovery of shareholder
investment, and only then treat the shareholder as
recognizing gain. Gordon's article also prefers the latter result, which iscontrary to the limited applicable
authority,1° but on somewhat different grounds. As
for adjusted basis going forward, the ex post tracing
could remain intact. No blending or averaging of
basis need occur: 10 shares would have exhausted
all their basis, while each of the remaining 10 shares
would have a basis of $1.
The words of Code Sec. 301 permit this result. They
create sufficient ambiguity to allow either an aggregate
or unit-by-unit approach. Subsection (c)(2) requires
that the distribution reduce the adjusted basis of "the
stock." The antecedent in Code Sec. 301 (a)refers to a
distribution by a corporation with respect to "its stock."
"The stock" could refer to a share by share determination or could refer back to the aggregate of "its stock"
on which the corporation makes the distribution.
The result should not change if the shareholders
ratably transfer shares to the corporation on receipt
of the distribution. Suppose the same shareholder
who owns 20 shares transferred 10 shares to the
corporation on receipt of the $140 distribution. Assume further that Code Sec. 302(d) applies to treat
the transaction as a Code Sec. 301 distribution. It
seems inappropriate in this context to apply a tracing
rule modeled on Reg. §1.1012-1(c). That provision
provides rules for determining which shares acquired
on different dates or at different prices the holder sold
or transferred, but Code Sec. 302(d) by its terms characterizes the transaction as a distribution of property,
not as asale or exchange. Application of an aggregate
approach rather than a unit-by-unit approach seems
warranted. It follows that neither the first-in rule nor
the shareholder identification rule of the regulation
should apply. Rather, under an aggregate approach
the shareholder once again should recognize no gain.
The only remaining issue concerns the allocation of
the unused $10 of basis. The logic of using the tracing approach ex post might treat five of each batch
of stock as retained. Five shares would have a basis
of $2 each and five a basis of zero.
Another area where application of an aggregate approach ex ante produces more logical results than a
TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE

strict unit-by-unit analysis arises when a shareholder
receives boot in a reorganization. Suppose the sole
shareholder of X Corporation, who owns 10 shares
with a basis of five and 10 shares with a basis of 10,
exchanges them in a reorganization for 20 shares
of Corporation Y stock worth 130 and cash of 70.
Code Sec. 356 requires the shareholder to recognize
gain on the exchange up to the amount of the nonqualifying consideration. On an aggregate view, the
shareholder has engaged in a single exchange, giving rise to gain of 50, which the shareholder should
recognize in full.
The regulations, however, apply a different result
under its unit tracing theory. Reg. §1.358-2(a)(2)(ii)
allocates a pro rata portion of the Y stock and a pro
rata portion of the cash to each X share. The regulations thus deem the shareholder to have received
10 shares of Y stock and 35 of cash in exchange for
the low-basis X shares, producing a realized gain of
50, of which the shareholder recognizes 35. On the
exchange of the other block of X stock the shareholder realizes no gain or loss. The regulations allow
the shareholder to alter this result when the terms
of the exchange specify that shares of a particular
class or money are received in exchange for specified shares of stock or for shares of a specific class
and the terms are economically reasonable.,, A dual
exchange presumably satisfies economic reasonableness if the consideration for each part represents fair
market value. As a consequence, if the exchange
agreement allocated cash of 70 and Y stock worth
30 to the high-basis batch and the remainder of theY
stock to the low basis batch, the shareholder would
12
recognize no gain.

This result strains the language of Code Sec. 356(a)
(1), which requires recognition of "the gain" when
"the exchange" includes boot. The regulations in effect treat the transaction as two exchanges, each with
its own calculation of gain. Further, the exchange of
cash of 70 and Y stock worth 30 for the high basis
stock, standing alone, probably would not even
qualify for reorganization treatment on continuity of
interest grounds. Treating the separate exchange in
this example as a taxable transaction does not give
rise to gain, since the basis of the X shares exactly
equals the consideration received, but has other
implications." For example, the Y stock would take
a new holding period.
An earlier authority, Rev. Rul. 74-515,14 took a
similar bifurcation approach. There, X, a publicly held
corporation with both common and preferred stock
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outstanding, merged into Y corporation. Holders of
X corporation common stock received Y corporation
common stock. Holders of X corporation preferred
stock received cash. Some shareholders owned only
one class of stock or the other, while other shareholders owned some of both. The ruling held the boot
provision inapplicable to shareholders who owned
solely one class or the other: Common shareholders
received only qualified consideration and no boot;
preferred stockholders received no qualified consideration, did not come within Code Sec. 356, and
simply redeemed their stock. The Ruling did apply
Code Sec. 356 to shareholders who owned both
classes of stock. It allocated the mixed consideration
by class, deeming the common exchanged for common stock and the preferred for cash. Shareholders
who received cash greater than their basis in the
preferred stock recognized gain. Shareholders whose
basis in the preferred exceeded the cash received,
however, could not recognize loss, by reason of
Code Sec. 356(c).
When carried too far, however, application of the
unit-tracing approach so as to treat the event as two
separate exchanges undermines the stacking rule
established by the Code for the treatment of boot in a
reorganization. That rule recognizes the gain realized
in a reorganization to the extent that the shareholder
receives cash in the exchange. Rev. Rul. 74-515
carved out a limited exception when it distinguished
what appears to be a class of traditional preferred
stock from common stock, both widely held. The
regulations, however, do not limit its two-exchanges
result to such cases. Reg. §1.358-2(c), Examples
4 and 5, refer to a second class of stock, without
further specification, so that two classes of common stock in a closely held corporation apparently
would qualify. Moreover, although these examples
deal with shares of different classes, Reg. §1.358-2(a)(ii) allows an exchange agreement to specify the
consideration "for a particular share" of stock. Thus,
as noted, shareholders who own high basis and low
basis stock of the same class may stack the high-basis
batch against the cash in the exchange agreement
and thereby defeat current gain recognition, subject
only to the limitation that the terms of the exchange
must be "economically reasonable."
As Gordon's article notes, this unittracing approach
may leave unused some portion of the old-share basis
in the exchange for boot. Suppose the shareholder
who holds 10 shares with basis of five each and 10
shares with basis of 10 each, exchanges them for

total consideration of 190, allocating the low basis
stock for shares in the acquiring company worth 95
and the high basis stock for 95 cash. Gordon's article
proposes to recognize the five of unused basis in
the latter exchange as a loss. 15 This result undercuts
the statutory pattern. The reorganization provisions
grant shareholders deferral of realized gain but they
do not allow a shareholder to defer gain and also to
recognize loss. When a shareholder receives both
qualified property and boot in a reorganization,
Code Sec. 356(c) bars recognition of loss "from the
exchange." Moreover, a loss recognition rule would
encourage shareholders in a closely held corporation
who anticipate its eventual disposition to bifurcate
their stock investment, loading capital contributions
onto one batch only. The regulations should not encourage creation of losses in this way. Instead, they
should allocate the unused basis to the qualified
property received on the exchange.
Gordon's article makes a number of innovative
policy recommendations, some of which would
require legislative action, while the Treasury could
implement still others under current law. The article
directs a number of proposals at "ordinary shareholders," those who hold less then five percent
of the stock of a publicly traded company. These
shareholders almost always hold their shares as
a financial interest and without any direct impact
on the operations of the corporation itself. One
proposal would treat all sales of stock back to the
corporation as exchanges entitled to capital gain or
loss treatment. Under this proposal, the usual tests
under Code Sec. 302(b) for treating a redemption
as a Code Sec. 301 distribution, generally with
dividend consequences, would not apply. In some
instances of corporate buybacks of shares, application of the Code Sec. 302(b) tests to a particular
shareholder may depend on the actions of other
shareholders in order to determine whether the fractional interest in the corporation represented by the
shareholder's remaining shares has declined.'6 The
Code Sec. 302(b) tests for distinguishing exchanges
from dividend equivalent distributions have worked
reasonably well for closely held corporations or
when a shareholder has a dominant interest in a
publicly traded corporation. When the shareholder
has only a tiny fractional interest in the corporation
to begin with, however, the Code Sec. 302(b) tests
may produce arbitrary results. Gordon's proposal
deserves consideration, with one caveat, whether
Continued on page 258

The gain recognized in a taxable exchange
of the high basis batch will equal the gain
recognized under Code Sec. 356 if the consideration equals or exceeds the basis in the
old shares and the basis exceeds the value
of the new stock received. For example, if
the total cash consideration on the exchange
increased to 90, and the exchange specified
a swap of the 100-basis batch for 90 of cash
and 30 in Y stock, under the regulations the
shareholder would recognize 20 of gain under Code Sec. 356, the same amount as the
shareholder would recognize on a taxable
exchange.
14 Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 CB 118.
11The preamble to the regulations raised the
question of whether to allow loss recognition, but did so in the context of a twoclass example similar to Rev. Rul. 74-515.
T.D. 9244, 2006-1 CB 463. As noted, Rev.
Rul. 74-515 held that no loss would be
recognized.
16 Compare Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 CB
92,
with Rev. Rul 81-289, 1981-2 CB 82.
13

to draw the line at five percent or
some lower figure.
By carefully working through the
implications of the unit-by-unit rule
of Reg. §1.358-2, Gordon's article
has disclosed many of the nuances
and questions that lie in its application. I would modify the regulation
further with incorporation of an
aggregate basis rule to take account
of corporate distributions in the
form of cash or other recognition
property. Gordon's article makes an
excellent start on the work of clarifying the practical implications of the
regulation. Now theTreasury needs
to continue the process of refining
its handiwork.
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